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CURRENT LEGISLATION
BANKING
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISORY
ACT OF 1966
Federal regulation of federally insured banks and savings and loan
associations) is divided among five agencies-the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB), the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) 2-whose common objective is to maintain sound financial institu-
tions.3 Their primary approach in attaining this objective is to insure that
the management of these institutions operate prudently and in accordance
with specific laws, rules, and regulations. { They have relied heavily upon
the supervisory process as the method for implementing this approach!)
The supervisory authorities, however, have not been able to secure prompt
correction of unsatisfactory practices on their own terms, because the sanc-
tions provided to support supervision were not adaptable to the problems.°
Congress passed the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 7 (here-
I Very few financial institutions do not carry federal insurance. See, e.g., 1965
FDIC Ann. Rep. 116.
2 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has jurisdiction over federal savings and
loan associations. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 132, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(a) (1964). The members of this Board are the trustees of the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation. National Housing Act § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1256 (1934),
as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1725(a) (1964). The Board thereby controls state savings and
loan associations and cooperative banks which carry the Corporation's insurance. National
Housing Act § 403(a), 48 Stat. 1257 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a) (1964).
The jurisdiction of the federal agencies in charge of banking overlaps in many
areas. By informal agreement, the responsibility for supervision of management is al-
located in the following manner: the Comptroller of the Currency--national banks; the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System-state banks which are members
of the system; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-state nonmember banks
which carry that Corporation's insurance. See Welman, Jr., Allocation of Supervisory
Responsibility Today, in Bank Supervision 11, 18 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
pub. 1963). The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act recognizes this allocation of re-
sponsibility. FISA § 201, 80 Stat. 1046, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(q) (Supp. 1966).
3 Wyrick, The General Nature of Bank Supervision, in Bank Supervision 1, 2 (Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis pub. 1963).
4 Id. at 2-3. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 563.17 (1963).
5 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 4.04 (1958). See Heisler, Regulations Versus Ad-
ministrative Decisions, 18 Bus. Law. 240 (1962).
6 S. Rep. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
7
 80 Stat. 1028, [codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1966)1, amend-
ing the following acts: Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(d), as amended, 68 Stat.
634 (1954), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1964) ; National Housing Act §§ 401(b), 405(a), 407,
48 Stat. 1255, 1259, 1260 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724(b), 1728(a), 1730
(1964); National Housing Act § 408(c), added by 73 Stat. 692 (1959), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730a(c) (1964); Federal Deposit Insurance Act §§ 3, 7(i), 8, 9, 10(b), (c), 11(a), (i),
64 Stat. 873, 879, 881, 882, 884, 886 (1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813, 1817(1),
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inafter referred to as FISA) to correct these deficiencies by strengthening
the formal sanctions .°
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the act's effect on the reso-
lution of conflicts between the agencies and management, and, more spe-
cifically, to consider whether it remedies the previous deficiencies in the
formal sanctions and whether, at the same time, it contains adequate safe-
guards against misuse of its provisions. The comment will first describe
control by supervision. Second, an examination will be made of the new
sanctions found in the act: (1) cease-and-desist orders; and (2) suspen-
sion, removal, and prohibition orders. Finally, the comment will discuss
the problems which will face management as it seeks to secure an adjudica-
tion of its rights.
I. BACKGROUND: CONTROL BY SUPERVISION
A description of control by supervision is essential to an understanding
of why FISA was passed and to appreciate the scope and effect of the act.
Supervision is a three-step process involving fact-finding, appraisal, and
correction of unsatisfactory practices. The first step, fact-finding, involves
a yearly examination of every aspect of the institution's operations.° The
examiner will list and appraise loans, investments, and fixed assets, and also
will analyze such items as deposit, income, expense, reserve, and capital
accounts. Then, from the results in these areas, he will evaluate the quality
of management. Finally, the examiner will draft a report containing relevant
statistics, a notation of unusual activities, other comments, and criticisms.
The second step is an appraisal of these findings by the examiner, the
regional supervisor, and eventually the central office to determine whether
any practices disclosed by the report are unsatisfactory and in need of cor-
rection." Despite the fact that a large number of statutory provisions,
rules, and regulations circumscribe management conduct, the supervisory
authorities have great leeway in making this determination. Many of these
provisions are phrased in such imprecise terms that their interpretation
and application depend on supervisory judgment. For example, the regula-
tions provide that state banks which are members of the Federal Reserve
1818, 1819, 1820(b), (c), 1821(a), (i) (1964). FISA also repealed: Federal Deposit
Insurance Act § 7(j) (6), added by 78 Stat. 941 (1964), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(6) (1964);
Banking Act of 1933, § 30, 48 Stat. 193, 12 U.S.C. § 77 (1964). The act also increased the
federal insurance limit from $10,000 to $15,000. FISA §§ 301-03, 80 Stat. 1055 [codified
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.0 A. (Supp. 1966)1. Except for the increase in the in-
surance limit, the act expires June 30, 1972. PISA § 401, 80 Stat. 1056 (1966).
8 See S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 6, at 1, 4-6.
9
 For a description of examination methods, see H.R. Rep. No. 447, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess, 43-46 (1963); 1965 FDIC Ann. Rep. 17-18; Chapin, Techniques of Bank
Examination, in Bank Supervision 21-26 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis pub. 1963);
Fox, Supervision of Banking by the Comptroller of the Currency, in Public Administra-
tion and Policy Formation 120, 158-63 (Redford ed. 1956). National banks are examined
approximately twice a year. Federal Reserve Act § 21, 38 Stat. 271 (1913), as amended,
12 U.S.C, § 481 (1964).
to See Isbell, Review and Appraisal, in Bank Supervision 27-31 (Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis pub. 1963). These three levels of authority are found in each agency
and are generally referred to in this comment as the "supervisory authorities."
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System must maintain adequate capital." What factors are to be con-
sidered in determining whether the institution has adequate capital and
has taken proper steps to maintain that capital, in addition to the relative
weight to be assigned to each factor, are left to supervisory judgment."
Furthermore, even when there is an unambiguous regulation governing
management conduct, the supervisory authorities may determine that a
practice conforming to the regulation is unsatisfactory, if, under the circum-
stances, it might involve an abnormal risk." For example, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board sets a maximum rate of return on. regular deposits;
generally the current rate is 4.75 per cent. 14 The supervisory authorities
could determine that a rate of return within this limit is unsatisfactory if
the association's earnings and its opportunities for investment were insuffi-
cient to justify such a rate.15
The third step is correction." The process begins in earnest when the
regional supervisor transmits a covering letter and the examiner's report to
the board of directors. The supervisory letter will note deviations from the
norm and demand correction of unsatisfactory conditions. Because so many
of the supervisory authorities' demands depend upon their own appraisal of
the facts, and because the area of criticism is so broad, the probability of
conflict between the agency and management is high. In an effort to resolve
any conflict, the regional supervisor and management will meet informally
to discuss the report and criticisms.
The supervisor's ability to resolve controversies and secure correc-
tions on his own terms hinges upon the risk to management of noncompliance
with the supervisory authorities' demands. The components of this risk are
the severity of the sanctions to which management is subject and the
probability that a particular sanction will be imposed. Consequently, in
analyzing the efficacy of the supervisory process, an examination will be
made of three categories of sanctions, the first two of which were unaltered
by FISA: (1) state sanctions; (2) federal informal sanctions; and (3)
federal formal sanctions.
The majority of federally insured financial institutions are state char-
tered" and, thus, subject to both state and federal control. Therefore, in
these instances the federal agency can supplement its power by making use
of state sanctions. There are, however, several difficulties with this approach.
11 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.6(c), .7(2) (1963). For a case upholding this requirement, see
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Woodall, 239 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 909 (1957).
12 In determining adequacy, capital is compared to the volume of marginal and
inferior quality assets, of deposits, and of risk assets. In determining the adequacy of
protection, the supervisory authorities examine dividend policies, expense control, and
earnings retention. Isbell, supra note 10, at 30.
13
 Crosse, General Bank Supervision and Regulation, in The Bankers' Handbook
1036, 1040 (Baughn & Walker ed. 1966).
14 31 Fed. Reg. 16763 (1966).
15 See 112 Cong. Rec. 25416 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966) (FHLBB memorandum on
unsafe or unsound practices).
16 See Isbell, supra note 10, at 31-33.
17 See, e.g., 1965 FDIC Ann. Rep. 99.
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First, in a given situation, state officials may be unwilling to act, either
because they apply a less strict standard to the facts or because, while
applying essentially the federal standard, they interpret the facts differently.' 8
Second, state officials are more subject to the influence of pressure groups,
since they have a smaller constituency than federal officials. Therefore, they
may be more hesitant to act, simply out of fear of antagonizing such groups?
Finally, even if the state officials are willing to act, they may not have suf-
ficient power. For example, in several states, the state agency does not
have authority to remove officers or directors2° or to issue enforceable cease-
and-desist orders.2 ' Thus, in many instances, state control will have no
effect on the federal agency-management dispute.
Management is subject to a number of informal federal sanctions. If
management seeks to borrow money from a Federal Home Loan Bank or
a Federal Reserve Bank, it may, as a condition precedent to the loan, be
forced to make corrections or at least sign an agreement giving assurances
that it will comply with the directions of the responsible agency. 22 Also, if
the institution desires to merge or branch, management may have to take
the same action before approval will be granted. 23 These pressures, however,
are of limited usefulness, since they are only available when management
requires "favors" from the agencies.
Another informal sanction involves the agency's use of its authority
to order additional, i.e., "special," examinations.24 The force of special ex-
aminations stems from the fact that the agency can charge examination
costs to the institution 25 and the fact that the examination disrupts daily
business. It would seem, however, that in many instances, these nuisance
effects will be outweighed by the expected benefits from the criticized prac-
tice and, therefore, will not be sufficient to secure corrections. On the other
hand, in small communities, where the examiner's presence is readily notice-
able, special examinations have a more forceful effect: 26 management will fear
is See Crosse, supra note 13, at 1048.
19 See Hearings on S. 3158 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
20 Id. at 67.
21
 E.g., Alabama and Idaho.
22
 See Fox, supra note 9, at 171.
23
 Ibid.
21
 E.g., Federal Reserve Act § 9, 40 Stat. 232 (1917), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 326
(1964). FISA broadens the permissible scope of the examination of savings and loan
associations and state nonmember banks by the FHLBB, the FSLIC, and the FDIC
to include the affairs of affiliates to whatever extent they may affect the institution.
FISA §§ 102(a) (m) (1), 203(b), 80 Stat. 1044, 1053, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1730(m) (1), 1820(b)
(Supp. 1966). Thus, the power to harass by examination is increased. The Board of
Governors and the Comptroller of the Currency already had a similar power. Banking
Act of 1933, §§ 5(c), 28(b), 48 Stat. 162, 194, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 338, 481 (1964).
25
 The Board of Governors may charge the expense of special examinations against
the individual bank. Federal Reserve Act § 9, 40 Stat. 232 (1917), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 326 (1964). The Comptroller of the Currency must assess the expense against the
institution. Federal Reserve Act § 21, 38 Stat. 271 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 482
(1964).
26
 Sec Isbell, supra note 10, at 32.
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that depositors may become alarmed at the frequency of examinations and
begin a "run" on the institution. It is, however, contrary to the agency's
interest to shake public confidence in the institution. 21 Therefore, in small
communities the agency will riot use frequent examinations as an instrument
of coercion except in the most serious cases." s
In light of the above discussion, it seems that both state sanctions and
federal informal sanctions are unreliable tools with which to secure correc-
tions. The remaining category to be considered in measuring the risk of
noncompliance is federal formal sanctions. Before FISA, the primary formal
sanctions and the agencies which could impose them were as follows: The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Comptroller
of the Currency could remove officers and directors of state member and
national banks;- 9 the FHLBB could seize federal savings and loan associa-
tions3° and could issue correction orders to these associations; 3 t finally, the
FDIC and the FSLIC could terminate insurance."
These sanctions, except for correction orders, were extremely severe.
The removal of an officer deprived him of his livelihood." Seizure deprived
individuals of the right to manage their own property. Termination of
insurance would eventually force the institution to either .merge or dis-
solve, as few individuals would thereafter entrust their money to the institu-
2? See Fox, supra note 9, at 124.
28 For congressional criticism of the use of special examinations for coercive purposes,
see H.R. Rep. No. 447, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
2° Banking Act of 1933, § 30, 48 Stat. 193. The Board of Governors has had the
additional sanction of expelling, after hearing, banks from membership in the Federal
Reserve System, Federal Reserve Act § 9, 38 Stat. 259 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 327 (1964). Furthermore, upon such expulsion, federal insurance has been automatically
terminated. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 8(b), 64 Stat. 880 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)
(1964). The sanction thus has had much the same defects as termination of insurance.
The Board of Governors also has had the sanction of suspending from the credit facilities
of the system member banks who unduly use their credit. Banking Act of 1933, § 3(a),
48 Stat. 163, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
3° Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(d)(2), as amended, 68 Stat. 635 (1954),
12 U.S.C. § 14&4(d)(2) (1964).
31 Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(d) (1), as amended, 68 Stat. 634 (1954), as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1) (1964). It should be noted that the FHLBB has had
authority to expel members from the Federal Home Loan Bank System, but this did
not result in automatic termination of insurance. Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 6(i),
47 Slat. 279 (1932), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1426(i) (1964). FISA, however, provides
that expulsion carries with it automatic termination of insurance. FISA § 102(a) (i), 80
Stat. 1041, 12 U,S.C,A. § 1730 (Supp. 1966). Consequently, when the Board now expels
a member, that bank automatically loses its insurance.
82
 Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 8, 64 Stat. 879 (1950), 12 U.S.C, § 1818 (1964) ;
National Housing Act § 407, 48 Stat. 1260 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C, § 1730 (1964).
It should be noted that termination was the only major formal sanction available against
state chartered institutions which were not members of the Federal Reserve System.
Such institutions comprise the largest segment of the industry. See, e.g., 1965 FDIC Ann.
Rep. 99.
33 Actually, this sanction did not effectively protect the public, because the removed
officer could continue to exercise his deleterious influence through his stockholdings or
deposits.
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tion.34 Moreover, in some states, an institution could not operate without
federal insurance." Finally, from the agencies' viewpoint, to seize an insti-
tution or terminate its insurance was to acknowledge, to some extent, that
the agency had failed in that it was unable to keep financial institutions
running smoothly.
The severity of seizure and termination was increased by the fact that
imposition of either sanction would likely aggravate the institution's, un-
satisfactory condition. The sanctions could not practically be imposed
without informing the public that the institution had been mismanaged.
As the depository of private funds, the institution and the industry as a
whole depend on public confidence in their soundness. Publicity of mis-
management would shake public confidence in the institution and raise
doubts about the soundness of the entire industry, eventually resulting in a
substantial increase in withdrawals." These withdrawals could cause more
damage than the practice sought to be corrected. Thus, in most instances,
the agencies would be defeating their own purpose to impose such sanctions.
All the sanctions, except the FHLBB's summary seizure power, were
unwieldy. Lengthy hearings were required before removal and termination
orders could be issued. In the latter case, the agency had to give the institu-
tion 120 days to make corrections before hearings could be held. Issuing
correction orders involved the most delay. Only after a full hearing could
the FHLBB issue an order requiring a federal association to correct viola-
tions of law or regulation. Before such hearings could be held, however, the
institution could bring suit in the appropriate district court to have that
court decide the controversy. The Board invoked this authority twice, and
both times the institution brought the controversy into court. 37 In one case,
three years were spent in pretrial motions and discovery proceedings."
Such delay could be critical, since the institution's assets are easily trans-
ferable, and thus, dishonest or grossly incompetent management could ruin
an institution before the agencies could gain control of the situation."
Thus, the pre-FISA formal sanctions could be categorized by their sever-
ity, by the likelihood that their imposition would further damage the institu-
tion, and by the fact that they were cumbersome to apply. Because of these
34
 Hearings on S. 3158 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1966) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
35 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-412 (Supp. 1966).
38 House Hearings 46-47; Fox, supra note 9, at 124. One sanction depends entirely
on publicity: the FDIC may publish details of examination reports insofar as they
relate to supervisory directives which management has failed to follow. Federal Deposit
Insurance Act § 18(f), 64 Stat. 892 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(f) (1964). The Comptroller
of the Currency has similar authority. Banking Act of 1933, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 192, as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1964). The agencies consider the sanction so drastic that it
is rarely used. 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 4.04 (1958). In one instance, however,
the Comptroller used the threat of this sanction to compel several New York City banks
to reduce interest rates to within legal limits. Fox, supra note 9, at 172-73.
37
 Senate Hearings 12.
38 Id. at 11.
39 See id. at 16.
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defects, the agencies were extremely reticent to resort to formal sanctions."
The only other use the agencies could make of the formal sanctions was to
threaten to impose them. To be effective, however, the threat had to be
used in circumstances in which the opposing party would consider it
probable that the threat would be consummated. Since the agencies were so
reluctant even to begin proceedings, their threat to impose sanctions would
lack credibility in many instances. Therefore, the threat could be effectively
employed only in the more serious problem cases.
Before FISA, the risk of noncompliance was therefore low, because it
was unlikely that effective sanctions would be imposed. This low risk was
brought into focus by two recent developments in the industry—rapid ex-
pansion and tight money.'" These changes lowered the quality of manage-
ment and increased the pressures upon it to take greater risks. The agencies
were less able to convince management of the validity of their judgments
and, therefore, were forced to rely on a compulsion that was in fact in-
adequate to secure corrections. As an end result, the agencies were unable to
secure prompt correction of many unsatisfactory practices 42 and accepted
less by way of corrections than they preferred. 43 An agency may have felt
that an institution needed $400,000 more capital; it would accept an in-
crease of $250,000. An agency may have felt that an executive officer was
incompetent and should be replaced; it would accept a system whereby the
directors would pass on all loans. The agencies also waited longer before
demanding some corrections. Executive salaries may have been too high; an
agency would wait until earnings were dangerously low before pressing the
point. Furthermore, they let some unsatisfactory aspects, e.g., inadequate
separation between tellers and customers, pass with simple criticism. Thus,
preventive supervision failed to realize its potential. This was demonstrated by
an increasing number of bank failures, the most notorious of which was the
failure of the San Francisco National Bank in 1965." Congress sought to
remedy this undesirable situation through revision of the formal sanctions.
4° See id. at 51. To illustrate: the FDIC annually institutes termination proceedings
against approximately five banks. See 1965 FDIC Ann. Rep. 19. Yet the cases which
warrant serious supervisory concern are often twenty times that number. See Senate
Hearings 72. When the FDIC does institute proceedings, it makes sure that it has a
substantial case. Termination proceedings rarely proceed to the issuance of a termina-
tion order. In approximately 40% of the cases, the bank makes the demanded corrections.
In approximately 54% of the cases, the bank merges or suspends operation before a
termination date is set. Only in approximately 6% of the cases is a date set for termination
of insured status. See 1965 FDIC Ann. Rep. 19.
41 Rapid expansion has created a shortage of capable, experienced management,
particularly in small communities, and an increasing number of speculators and some
criminal elements have filled the gap. See Senate Hearings 24, 33, 39-40. The rising cost
of acquiring money has put a squeeze on earnings. Perhaps to maintain earning levels,
management has increasingly tended to engage in high-risk, high-return ventures. Id.
at 39.
42 S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 6, at 4-6.
43 See Senate Hearings 107, 110; House Hearings 31. The examples that follow in
the text were obtained through interviews with agency representatives in Boston, Massa-
chusetts, during January 1967.
" See 1965 FDIC Ann. Rep. 180-81. Between 1962 and 1966, there were twenty
bank failures. See id. at 180; Senate Hearings 87.
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The issue to be examined now is whether the formal sanctions provided by
FISA increase the risks of noncompliance so that supervisory authorities can
secure prompt correction of unsatisfactory practices on their own terms.
II. THE MAJOR FORMAL SANCTIONS UNDER FISA
A. Cease-and-Desist Orders
The cease-and-desist sanction will be the most useful tool by which the
agencies will be able to prevent or correct unsatisfactory practices. Under
FISA, whenever, in the opinion of the agency, the institution violates a law,
rule, regulation, charter, or written agreement with the agency, or commits
an unsafe or unsound practice, the agency may serve notice of intent to
issue a cease-and-desist order." If, after a hearing the proscribed conduct
has been established, the agency may issue an order requiring the institu-
tion to conform and to take whatever affirmative action is necessary to
correct the conditions resulting from such conduct." The preventive nature
of the remedy is underscored by the provision allowing the agency to begin
proceedings if there are reasonable grounds to believe the institution "is
about to engage in" an unsafe or unsound practice or "is about to violate"
a law, rule, regulation, charter, or written agreement with the agency. 17
The sanction's utility depends upon whether it can be readily employed
in the agency-management dispute, which in turn depends upon the construc-
tion of the words, "unsafe or unsound practice." These words have been in
federal legislation for over thirty years;" yet, they have not been defined
by either judicial opinion or official administrative pronouncement. The
vagueness of the phrase troubled many members of Congress during debate
over FISA. To meet their doubts, supporters of the act in both the House
and the Senate offered the following definition:
Generally speaking, an "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces any
action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted
standards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which,
if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an
institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the in-
surance funds."
Since there was no objection to this definition, it will probably be adopted
by both the courts and the agencies.
A comparison of "unsafe or unsound practices," as defined above, with
the practices typically criticized in letters from the regional supervisors
reveals that substantially the same degree of harm is involved and is arrived
at by the same process. Both branches criticize practices which are poten-
45
 FISA §§ 101(a)(2)(A), 102(a) (e) (1), 202(6)(1), 80 Stat. 1029, 1038, 1046, 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(2)(A), 1730(e)(1), 1818(b)(1) (Supp. 1966). Since the agency can
require affirmative action, "cease and desist" is in a sense a misnomer.
48 Ibid.
47
 Ibid.
48
 E.g., Banking Act of 1933, § 30, 48 Stat. 193.
48 112 Cong. Rec. 24022 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1966) (House) ; 112 Cong. Rec. 25416
(daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966) (Senate).
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tially harmful, i.e., involve a greater than acceptable risk, and both base
their decisions on an analysis of all relevant facts. 5° In addition, the scope
of an "unsafe or unsound practice," like the scope of supervision, "touches
upon the entire field of the operations of a financial institution." 51 Thus,
"unsafe or unsound" includes nearly all practices criticized in the initial
supervisory letter. Therefore, the agency in nearly all cases will be able to
institute cease-and-desist proceedings at the same time that it commences
the correction process by issuing a supervisory letter. 52
An "unsafe or unsound practice" does not cover all initial criticisms
because of the limitation that the practice be "contrary to generally accepted
standards of prudent operation."" The agency, however, will not have to
wait long before these other practices provide grounds for instituting pro-
ceedings. For example, since all lending is risk-taking, it is impossible to
avoid making a few loans whose value will deteriorate because of subsequent
changes in the borrower's ability to pay. Thus, having a few weak loans on
the ledger will not be contrary to generally accepted standards. 54 When, how-
ever, such loans are discovered by the examiner, they will be criticized and
corrective steps requested.55
 If management could improve the institution's
position on these loans, e.g., by requiring additional security, but fails to do
so within a reasonable time, it would seem that such a failure would be con-
trary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation and would there-
fore be grounds for instituting corrective proceedings.
The fact that cease-and-desist proceedings may be instituted at the be-
ginning of the correction process is not alone conclusive of the sanction's
utility. The FHLBB had a similar sanction, but it was ineffective because
it was unwieldy. 56 Under FISA, a permanent cease-and-desist order can only
be issued after notice of charges, a hearing, and an administrative finding that
grounds exist.57
 The order takes effect thirty days after service." The time
lapse between notice and an effective order will be approximately seven
months." During this interim the practice could cause serious damage.° To
11° See ibid.
51 Ibid.
52
 Previously, Congress spoke of continued unsafe or unsound practices. E.g., Bank-
ing Act of 1933, § 30, 48 Stat. 193. Now the phrase is stated in the singular and without
the qualifying adjective. This would seem to indicate a congressional intent that the
sanction be available at an early point in the correction process, and, therefore, that
the phrase should be interpreted liberally to achieve this end.
Quaere: what community's practices should serve as the standard? In the tort
area, one recommended solution places the emphasis on the potential harm rather than
on industrial practices. See The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
64
 See Isbell, supra note 10, at 29.
55
 See ibid.
56 See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
57
 See FISA §§ 101(a)(2) (A), 102(a)(e)(I), 202(6)(1), 80 Stat. 1029, 1038, 1046,
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(2)(A), 1730(e) (1), 1818(b)(I) (Supp. 1966).
58
 FISA §§ 101(a)(2)(B), 102(a)(e)(2), 202(b)(2), 80 Stat. 1029, 1038, 1047,
12 U.S.C.A. §§ I464(d)(2)(B), 1730(e) (2), 1818(b)(2) (Supp. 1966).
See 112 Cong. Rec. 24508 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1966) (letter from the Chairman of
the Board of Governors, W. McC. Martin, Jr.).
60 See Senate Hearings 16.
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obviate this difficulty, the agency is permitted to issue a temporary order to
take effect upon service and which remains in effect until the charges are
dismissed or a permanent order becomes effective.°1 The agency can only
issue the order if the conduct "is likely to cause insolvency . or substantial
dissipation of assets or earnings of the [institution] . . . , or is likely to other-
wise seriously prejudice the interests of [depositors]. . . ."° 2
How often the agency will be able to issue a temporary order hinges upon
the construction of the words "is likely to otherwise seriously prejudice." The
phrase "is likely" was substituted for "could" by the Senate Committee. They
wished to make clear that the possibility of such consequences be a reasonable
one; however, it was not intended to require a showing of definite probability."
A practice which involves the reasonable possibility of seriously prejudicing the
interests of depositors must involve a lesser degree of harm than one which
could possibly lead to insolvency or substantial dissipation of assets or earn-
ings; otherwise, the additional words "seriously prejudice" would be mean-
ingless. In determining how much less, the fact that the purpose of FISA is
to enable the agencies to prevent loss in financial institutions should be ac-
corded great weight. Since the assets of financial institutions are subject to
rapid dissipation, the agencies must be able to act quickly to prevent loss.
Therefore, a broad construction of the prerequisites for issuing temporary
orders is most consistent with the underlying purpose of EISA. The proper
construction would be to interpret "seriously prejudice" as equivalent to "un-
safe or unsound" so that an agency could issue a temporary order whenever
it discovered an unsafe or unsound practice. The definition of "unsafe or un-
sound" is stated in terms of the possibility of abnormal risk. If the objection-
able practice involves the possibility of abnormal risk, it would be reasonable
to hold that it also involves the possibility of seriously prejudicing the in-
terests of depositors. Moreover, granting the agency such latitude would not
make the words "seriously prejudice" meaningless, since a violation of a minor
regulation would not fit within the phrase, inasmuch as •it would not involve
the possibility of abnormal risk. 64
Measured against pre-FISA defects, the cease-and-desist sanction is not
unwieldy, since proceedings can be instituted at the beginning of the correction
process, and since temporary orders can be issued in most cases at the same
time. Furthermore, the issuance of a cease-and-desist order need not entail any
harmful publicity, and thus should not aggravate the institution's financial con-
dition; also, since the order does not require a change in management or a
cessation of independent operation, it is not so severe as to inhibit its use. Con-
sequently, the cease-and-desist sanction has none of the deficiences of the pre-
FISA sanctions. It can be readily employed at an early point in the agency-
G 1 'EISA §§ 101(a)(3)(A), 102(a)(1)(1), 202(c)(1), 80 Stat. 1030, 1038, 1047,
12 tLS.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(3)(A), 1730(f)(1), 1818(c)(1) (Supp. 1966).
62 Ibid.
63 S. Rep. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 22 (1966).
64 To illustrate, if a federal savings and loan association, without prior approval,
builds a drive-in facility 501 feet instead of 500 feet from a public entrance to the
association, it would violate 12 C.F.R. § 545.14-1 (Supp. 1966), but its action, it would
seem, would not seriously prejudice the interests of its savings-account holders.
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management dispute; in addition, it can be electively employed, since the
agency can immediately seek an injunction to enforce the order."
In terms of control by supervision, if management refuses to comply with
supervisory directives, it is highly probable that the agency will force man-
agement to comply by employing the cease-and-desist sanction. Because of the
negative psychological impact of being the party against whom a sanction is
imposed, and because of the expense and time involved in contesting the im-
position of the sanction, management will, in many instances, follow super-
visory directives rather than force the agency to employ the sanction. Thus,
the mere presence of the cease-and-desist sanction greatly facilitates control
by supervision.
B. Suspension, Removal, and Prohibition Orders
A cease-and-desist order is not sufficient to deal with all supervisory prob-
lems. Some officers and directors exploit their positions for personal advan-
tage," and some controlling stockholders and large influential depositors run
the institution from behind the scenes for the same purpose." These indi-
viduals often have past records of ruining other institutions." Because the in-
stitution's assets are readily transferable, such individuals can do substantial
damage in a relatively short period of time." If limited only by a cease-and-
desist order as to one practice, they can always devise another scheme to ex-
ploit the institution." The suspension, removal, and prohibition sanctions were
drawn to meet these problems:a
Section 101 (a) (4) (A) of the act" provides three criteria for instituting
proceedings against an officer or director for conduct with respect to the in-
65
 FISA §§ I01(a) (8), 102(a) (k) (2), 202(i), 80 Stat. 1034, 1042, 1051, 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ I464(d)(8), 1730(k) (2), 1818(i) (Supp. 1966), There sections are phrased generally
and apply to any notice or order issued under the act, A largely duplicative provision
states that the agency may seek an injunction against a threatened violation of a tem-
porary cease-and-desist order. FISA §§ 101(a)(3)(C), 102(a) (f)(3), 202(d), 80 Stat.
1030, 1039, 1047, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(3)(C), 1730(1)(3), 1818(d) (Supp. 1966).
The section provides that if the threatened violation is established, "it shall be the duty
of the court to issue such injunction." Ibid. Whether this was intended to, or constitu-
tionally can, eliminate judicial discretion is uncertain. Cf. The Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321
U.S. 321 (1944).
66 See House Hearings 37.
67
 Senate Hearings 40.
68 Id. at 25, 33, 40.
69 Id. at 40.
70 House Hearings 37.
71 The Senate Committee felt that it would be dangerous to give the sanctions of
suspension, removal, and prohibition to one man. S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 63, at
8-9. They, therefore, required the Comptroller of the Currency to certify the facts to
the Board of Governors; the Board, with the Comptroller as a member (if he so desires),
then decides whether to take action. FISA §§ 202(e)(2), (4), (6), (7), 80 Stat. 1048,
1049, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1818(e)(2), (4), (6), (7) (Supp. 1966).
72
 FISA §§ 101(a)(4) (A), 102(g) (1), 202(e)(1), (2), (7), 80 Stat. 1030, 1039,
1047, 1048, 1049, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(4)(A), 1730(g)(1), 1818(e)(1), (2), (7) (Supp.
1966). Each section has substantially identical counterparts to deal with the different
agencies, In the text of this comment, the first section number is given to avoid con-
fusion in the textual discussion. When a section number is mentioned in the text, the
footnote citation is to each point in the act where the section is repeated.
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stitution with which he is presently serving. First, an officer or director must
have either committed a violation of law, rule, regulation, or a cease-and-desist
order which has become final (i.e., one from which there is no longer any right
to appeal), or engaged or participated in an unsafe or unsound practice or
breach of fiduciary duty. Second, his conduct must be such that it will probably
cause substantial financial loss or other damage to the institution, or such
that it could seriously prejudice the interests of account holders. Third, the
conduct must involve personal dishonesty. If, in the opinion of the agency,
the officer or director has committed such conduct, the agency may serve notice
of intent to remove him after hearing. 73
Section 101(a) (4) (B) 74 provides somewhat less overlapping criteria for
instituting proceedings against an officer or director who has mismanaged other
financial or business institutions and is, therefore, likely to harm the institution
with which he is presently serving. Whenever, in the opinion of the agency,
an officer or director has evidenced personal dishonesty and unfitness by con-
duct with respect to another financial or other business institution, which re-
sulted in substantial financial loss or other damage, the agency may serve
notice of intent to remove him after hearing and/or prohibit him from further
participation in the conduct of the institution's affairs. This section also covers
any other person participating in the institution's affairs who has committed
objectionable conduct with respect to that institution or any other business.
Although apparently aimed at principal stockholders and influential depositors,
this section is not thus limited as to class of persons.
Section 101(a) (4) (C) permits the agency to temporarily suspend and/or
prohibit any of these individuals from participating in the institution's affairs
pending completion of the administrative process." The agency may issue tem-
porary orders if it "deems it necessary for the protection of the [institution]
... or the interests of its [depositors] . . • . "76
As drawn, these sections present a difficult problem of statutory con-
struction. Section 101(a) (4) (A) is the only one which deals with dishonest
conduct of an officer or director with respect to the institution with which he
is presently serving. The only sanction mentioned in that section is removal.
Therefore, one could argue that the agency, after hearing, can only remove
73 This multiplicity of criteria was created when the Senate Committee added the
prerequisite of personal dishonesty, S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 63, at 7-8, but failed
to redraft the section in that light. It is highly probable that if an officer or director
has been dishonest in conducting the affairs of the institution, he will have either
breached his fiduciary duty or committed an unsafe or unsound practice. Letter from
Vice-Chairman Robertson of the Board of Governors, Dec. 2, 1966; letter from Paul E.
McGraw, attorney for the FHLBB, Dec. 21, 1966. Furthermore, given the grave character
of the conduct, it should not be difficult to show that the conduct could seriously prejudice
the interests of depositors. Thus, in almost all cases, if personal dishonesty is established,
the other prerequisites will be met.
74
 FISA §§ 101(a)(4)(B), 102(a)(g)(2), 202(e) (3), (4), (7), SO Stat. 1031, 1039,
1048, 1049, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(4)(B), 1730(g)(2), 1818(e)(3), (4), (7) (Supp.
1966).
76
 FISA §§ 101(a) (4)(C), 102(a) (g)(3), 202(e) (5), (6), (7), 80 Stat. 1031, 1039,
1048, 1049, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(4)(C), 1730(g)(3), 1818(e)(5), (6), (7) (Supp.
1966).
76 Ibid.
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the officer or director, and that such an individual cannot be permanently
prohibited from participating in the institution's affairs in another capacity.
Once having removed an officer or director, the agency could attempt to
proceed under section 101(a) (4) (B), which deals with dishonest conduct
with respect to the institution by any other person participating in its affairs
and which authorizes prohibition orders. There are, however, two difficulties
with this approach. First, the grounds for employing the second section are
stricter: The agency must show that the conduct caused substantial damage,
whereas in the first section the agency need only show that the interests of
depositors "could be seriously prejudiced" by the conduct. 77 Second, it would
lead to the absurd result of requiring two hearings involving the same facts
and the same individual.
It would be equally absurd to hold that an officer or director may be
temporarily prohibited from participating in the institution's affairs before
the proscribed conduct is established at a hearing, but that after the conduct
is established, the officer or director may not be thus prohibited. Such a holding
would substantially impair the utility of these sanctions. Often, the officer or
director will own substantial interests in the institution; thus removal would
not end his ability to exercise his influence in a damaging manner." It might
be argued that an official should not be subject to double punishment, that he
should only be subject to a permanent prohibition order if he has actually
caused substantial damage, and, furthermore, that he can always be pro-
hibited from further participation if he evidences dishonesty after being re-
moved. However, the purpose of the sanctions is not to punish misconduct,
but is to protect the public against the consequences of this misconduct. The
public should not be required to bear the risk that an individual who has just
been found to be dishonest will use his position as major stockholder or prin-
cipal depositor to again exploit the institution.
This problem can be avoided by a properly broad construction of the
section dealing with the orders which can be issued after hearing. Section 101
(a) (4) (D) provides that the agency may "issue such orders of suspension or
removal from office, and/or prohibition from participation in the conduct of
the affairs of the [institution] ... , as it may deem appropriate."" It would be
reasonable to interpret this as a general grant of authority to deal with the
established proscribed conduct in any manner suitable to protecting the in-
77
 It does not appear that Congress was consciously attempting to draw a distinc-
tion between the two sections. The reason for the divergence would seem to be that the
second section as originally drafted only required that the individual be "unfit." To give
this vague word meaning, the unfitness had to be demonstrated by conduct which actually
caused substantial injury. When the Senate Committee added the prerequisite of personal
dishonesty, S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 63, at 8, it was no longer necessary that the
concrete results of the conduct be proven, since personal dishonesty in itself would prob-
ably be sufficient evidence of unfitness. The Committee, however, neglected to redraft
the section in the light of its amendment.
78
 This was the reason given by one Comptroller of the Currency for his reluctance
to use the removal power granted by § 30 of the Banking Act of 1933. Fox, Supervision
of Banking by the Comptroller of the Currency, Public Administration and Policy Forma-
tion 120, 173-74 (Redford ed. 1956).
70
 FISA §§ 101(a) (4)(D), 102(a) (g)(4), 202(e)(8), 80 Stat. 1031, 1040, 1049, 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(4)(D), 1730(g) (4), 1818(e) (8) (Sapp. 1966).
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stitution and the public. This construction is supported by the following
reasoning. Section 101(a) (4) (A) states that the agency may serve notice
of intent to remove. Section 101(a) (4) (B) states that the agency may serve
notice of intent to remove and/or prohibit. Neither section speaks of notice
of intent to suspend; yet the provision dealing with orders after hearing clearly
authorizes the agency to issue a suspension order. If the agency can suspend
after hearing without giving notice of intent to suspend, it should be able to
prohibit after hearing without giving notice of intent to prohibit.
It might be argued, however, that because suspension is a lesser genre
of removal, the notice of intent to suspend can be implied in the notice of
intent to remove, but since prohibition is a different and more severe sanc-
tion than removal, notice of intent to prohibit cannot be implied in the notice
of intent to remove. Therefore, since to impose a sanction without giving an
individual warning deprives him of a fair hearing," the section should not
be construed as a general grant of authority to issue prohibition orders. This
argument should be rejected. First, prohibition is not a more severe sanction
than removal. Removal deprives an official of a source of income; prohibition
places him in no worse position financially. If he has invested in the institu-
tion, he could still receive his dividends, and, at most, he will be denied his
right to vote his stock. Second, the sanctions are of the same type because
they all segregate the individual from the institution. Third, the officer or
director has no greater burden of preparing a defense, since each sanction
would be imposed on the grounds stated in section 101(a) (4) (A). Finally, like
a defendant in a civil suit, the officer or director can be held to have notice
that he is subject to any remedy justified by the facts litigated at the hearing.8 '
Admittedly, the suggested reasoning does not explain Congress' failure
to provide for notice of intent to prohibit in section 101(a) (4) (A) while so
providing in section 101(a) (4) (B). However, if an individual evidences a
defect in character which makes him unfit to hold an office of public trust,
leaving him in a position where he can control the "trustees," i.e., manage-
ment, subjects the public to grave risks. Given the important public interest
that would be served by enabling the agencies to prohibit such individuals
from further participation in the institution's affairs, the discrepancy should
be considered a technical error in draftsmanship which in no way limits the
agencies' ability to deal with personal dishonesty in any manner appropriate
to fully protecting the public.
There is another possible solution to the problem of isolating a dishonest
officer or director from the institution. If the FISA penalties section, section
101(a) (12) (A), is literally construed, any individual subject to a temporary
suspension and/or prohibition order, or to a permanent suspension, removal,
and/or prohibition order from which there is no longer any right of appeal,
who participates in any manner in the conduct of the institution's affairs,
is liable to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both. 82 Thus, an officer subject to a temporary order or a final
88 Cf. Luacaw v. Fire Comm'r, 214 N.E.2d 734, 735 (Mass. 1966); Daley v. District
Court, 304 Mass. 86, 90-91, 23 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1939).
81
 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
82
 FISA II 101(a)(12)(A), 102(a)(p)(1), 202(j), 80 Stat. 1035, 1045, 1052, 12
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order could not participate in any capacity even if the order only states that
he is suspended or removed from office. This literal construction, however,
is only a partial solution, because, during the time interval from the effective
date of an order issued after hearing until the exhaustion of appeals, only
the specific terms of the order are in effect. One could argue from this literal
construction, however, that suspension or removal from office is to be defined
as suspension or removal from participation in any manner. If an officer, for
example, can be penalized for participating as a consultant even though the
final order only states that he is removed from office, Congress must have
intended to define removal from office as a proscription of participation in
any manner. If removal is so defined, then participation as a consultant would
violate the order, and the agency could seek an injunction to prevent such
participation. Thus, an officer could be prevented from participation in any
manner at all times. Both the literal interpretation of the penalties section
and the construction of suspension or removal from office based thereon are
difficult to accept. Suspension or removal from office is not commonly under-
stood as including a proscription of participation in another manner." If
Congress intended to add a broader connotation to suspension or removal
from office, it would not have done so abstrusely through a penalties section.
Moreover, Congress would not have provided that prohibition orders could
be issued in some instances against officers if suspension and removal were
to have the same effect as prohibition. One might argue that prohibition
orders refer only to persons other than officers or directors. However, the act
states that the agency can issue temporary suspension and/or prohibition or-
ders and permanent suspension, removal and/or prohibition orders against any
person. If prohibition referred only to persons other than officers and directors,
then the word "and" is superfluous. Finally, both constructions narrow the
agencies' discretion. Under some circumstances, suspension or removal from
office alone would be sufficient to protect the public. Yet, no matter how nar-
rowly the suspension or removal order is worded, the individual would be
subject to penalties at certain times, if he participated in any manner. In
order to preserve the agencies' discretion the penalties should be interpreted
as applicable only if the individual participates in a manner which violates
the specific terms of the order as those terms are ordinarily understood. Ad-
U.S.C.A. II§ 1464(d) (12)(A), 1730(p) (1), 1818(j) (Supp. 1966). A second clause within
the penalties section provides that a dishonest individual subject to a temporary or final
order must obtain the prior approval of the issuing agency if he wishes to vote for a
director, or serve as an officer, director, or employee not only of the institution with
which he was affiliated before the order but also of any institution carrying the same
federal insurance as that institution. If he does not obtain the approval before taking
such action, he is subject to a fine of not more than 85,000 or imprisonment for not
more than one year or both. Ibid. As the second clause is drawn, it would not apply to such
informal participation as acting as consultant without pay. Thus, an officer, prohibited
from participating in X Savings and Loan Association, can informally participate in
"Y Savings and Loan Association without obtaining prior approval. Also, as the second
clause is drawn, it would not apply to an individual who transfers to an institution
carrying different federal insurance. Thus, an officer, removed from office in A Bank
carrying FDIC insurance, can serve as an officer in B Savings and Loan Association
carrying FSLIC insurance.
83 See Fox, supra note 78, at 173-74.
613
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
mittedly, the agencies should be enabled to isolate a dishonest officer com-
pletely from the institution, but this can be achieved by allowing them to
issue prohibition orders whenever the dishonest conduct of an officer or
director merits it.
As originally introduced, the removal, suspension, and prohibition sec-
tions did not contain the requirement of personal dishonesty." The Senate
Committee was conscious, however, of the latitude allowed the agencies by
such phrases as "an unsafe or unsound practice," "could be seriously preju-
diced," and "unfitness."5 They considered removal too severe a remedy to
be applied as a matter of course." Consequently, they made personal dis-
honesty a prerequisite to imposing these sanctions. 87
There was some controversy before the House Committee as to whether
personal dishonesty included only conduct indictable under state and federal
law or also conduct such as self-dealing." Legislative history favors the
broader construction. Senator Proxmire, one of the leading members of the
Senate committee which added the phrase, defined "personal dishonesty"
as conduct demonstrating a fundamental lack of "the integrity demanded by
a position of public trust." 88 He further stated that the sanctions were meant
to stop "the flow of losses through the hands of self-seeking or criminal ele-
ments."" (Emphasis added.)
As construed, the suspension, removal, and prohibition sanctions give
the agencies effective means through which they can insulate financial insti-
tutions from dishonest individuals." By restricting the use of suspension,
removal, and prohibition orders to cases of personal dishonesty, however,
84 S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 63, at 7-8.
85 Ibid.
so Ibid.
87 Ibid,
88 Compare House Hearings 53 with House Hearings 135.
so 112 Cong. Rec. 19370 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1966).
tie Ibid. The fact that there is a separate provision for indictable conduct offers
additional support for construing personal dishonesty to include more than criminal
conduct. If any person participating in the institution's affairs is charged in any in-
formation, indictment, or complaint of a United States Attorney, with commission or
participation in a felony involving personal dishonesty or breach of trust, the agency
may issue a temporary suspension and/or prohibition order. If the individual is con-
victed and the conviction is no longer subject to judicial review, the agency can, without
hearing, make the order permanent. Acquittal or other disposition, however, does not
bar the agency from initiating proceedings under the other provisions. FISA §§ 101(a)
(5) (A), 102 (a) (h), 202(g) (1), 80 Stat. 1032, 1040, 1050, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d) (5) (A),
1730(h), 1818(g)(1) (Supp. 1966). Permitting the agency to proceed under the other
provisions is understandable; since suspension, removal, or prohibition is a civil sanction,
the agency should not be held to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof in
criminal proceedings.
DI To aid the FHLBB and FSLIC to keep track of dishonest individuals, FISA re-
quires institutions carrying FSLIC insurance to report changes in control to the Corpora-
tion. FISA § 102(a)(1), 80 Stat. 1042, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730(1) (Supp. 1966). Banks carry-
ing FDIC insurance have been subject to a similar provision since 1964. Federal Deposit
Insurance Act § 7(j), added by 78 Stat. 940, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(7)(j) (1964). In one
respect, the agencies seem to have too much authority. An individual could be excluded
from an institution for dishonest conduct that took place years before. A statute of
limitations should have been provided. See Senate Hearings 141.
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Congress has deprived the agencies of any efficient remedy to meet another
serious problem—grossly incompetent management. 92 Previously, the agencies
considered the maintaining of grossly incompetent management an unsafe
or unsound practice;" such practices constituted grounds for imposing the
pre-FISA sanctions.°4
 Congress has unequivocally manifested its intent that
personal dishonesty be a prerequisite to removal. Thus, an agency cannot
issue a cease-and-desist order directing that hazardous management be re-
placed, nor can it seize an institution or terminate its insurance on the ground
that it failed to replace hazardous management. True, hazardous management
will probably be reflected in other unsafe or unsound practices, but to force
the supervisory authorities to act on the peripheral results by requiring cor-
rection of each of these practices as they arise, instead of attacking the
source of the problem, places an unwarranted burden on the supervisory
process. It is urged that when Congress reconsiders the act, 95 it add gross
incompetency as a ground for issuing suspension, removal, and prohibition
orders.°G
92
 The agencies are not totally without remedies. In Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153
(9th Cir. 1964), the court held that the FHLBB could enforce by court action the
common-law fiduciary duties of directors and officers of federal savings and loan associa-
tions. It would seem that the rationale of the decision would be equally applicable to
the other agencies. However, court proceedings involve considerable delay and do not
guarantee that the individual will refrain from further damaging conduct.
93
 See 1953 FDIC Ann. Rep. 12.
94
 See, e.g., Banking Act of 1933, § 30, 48 Stat. 193.
95
 Except for the raise in the federal insurance limit, the act expires in 1972. FISA
§ 401, 80 Stat. 1056 (1966).
96
 The act makes some minor changes in the termination-of-insurance sanction.
FISA §§ 102(a) (b), 204, 80 Stat. 1036, 1054, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1730(b), 1818(a) (Supp.
1966), The insuring agency can shorten the correction period from 120 days to not less
than 20 days if it feels that its insurance risk would be unduly jeopardized or if a state
authority or other federal agency having jurisdiction requests it. Also, the insuring
agency can now institute proceedings if it finds that a single unsafe or unsound practice
has been committed. A new ground for instituting proceedings is that the insured is in
an unsafe or unsound condition to continue operations. Since an unsafe or unsound
practice is dealt with separately, an unsafe or unsound condition to continue operations
must mean something different. A reasonable construction of the latter ground would be
that it is applicable where the institution's financial condition is seriously impaired for
reasons other than mismanagement, e.g., where the locality's major industry closes down.
Since the insuring agency. remains liable for two years on all amounts present at the
effective date of the termination order (usually when all appeals have been exhausted),
the agency, to protect itself, is authorized to use the cease-and-desist sanction as long
as the institution has accounts covered by federal insurance. S. Rep. No. 1482, supra
note 63, at 18.
The grounds for seizure of a federal savings and loan association by the FHLBB
have also been modified. FISA § 101(a) (6) (A), 80 Stat. 1032, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)
(6) (A) (Supp. 1966); S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 63, at 13-14. The principal change is
that the commission of an unsafe or unsound practice or violation of law, rule, or
regulation is grounds for seizure now only if it has led to a substantial dissipation of assets
or earnings. The criteria of an unsafe or unsound condition to continue operations is a new
addition. Another ground for seizure is willful violation of a cease-and-desist order which
has become final, i.e., one as to which judicial review is no longer available. FISA
§ 101(a)(13) (A) (1), 80 Stat. 1035, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d) (13) (A)(1) (Supp. 1966).
This lends added weight to cease-and-desist orders.
The modifications do not change the severity of the termination and seizure sane-
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III. AD
 JUDICATORY STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL CONTROL
FISA gives the agencies sanctions which can be readily and effectively
employed to prevent objectionable management from ruining the institution.
Although the act serves the public interest by establishing strong agencies,
such agency power has other less desirable effects. First, since the presence
of the sanctions, particularly the cease-and-desist provisions, substantially
increases the risk to management of noncompliance with supervisory direc-
tives, the act permits too much emphasis on control by supervision. Some
agency representatives have indicated that the agencies will take advantage
of this new strength and issue fewer and less detailed regulations.° 7
 Thus, the
agencies' supervisory branches will bear even greater responsibility for setting
standards for the prudent operation of financial institutions. Second, these
representatives have indicated that the agencies will delegate more re-
sponsibility to the lower ranks of authority within the supervisory branches."
In recent years the agencies have tended to defer to the judgment of regional
supervisors and examiners in determining what aspects of the institution's
operations were unsatisfactory." They have also given these officials the
primary responsibility for securing corrections. 100
 Furthermore, management
appeals from the regional to the central office have been infrequent, partly
because the central office will usually support the determinations and di-
rectives of the lower ranks. 1°1
 Since the act places greater force behind the
directives of regional supervisors and examiners, the agencies can safely dele-
gate more authority to these officials. Third, because these officials will have
greater leeway in determining what to correct and can now secure corrections
on their own terms, they are likely to inject themselves even further into
management decision making. 102
tions. Their use will be further restricted by the presence of other new sanctions in the
act. The courts have required that the sanction imposed bear some reasonable relation
to the practice found to exist. Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115,
129-31 (1962); Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 268-71 (1965). Thus, if
the lesser sanctions could clearly have remedied the situation, the courts are less likely
to find that termination or seizure was reasonably related to the practice found to exist.
Finally, strict control of the use of the termination and seizure sanctions would be con-
sistent with legislative history. See S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 63, at 14,
For severe congressional criticism of the FHLBB's use of the seizure power, see
H.R. Rep, No. 2083, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) (seizure of the Long Beach Federal
Savings and Loan Association). For cases in which it was alleged that the FHLBB
threatened seizure unless management were replaced, see Greater Del. Valley Fed. Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 262 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1958); Miami Beach Fed. Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1958).
97 Senate Hearings 19-20, 110-11.
98
 See id. at 69.
99
 102 Adm'r of Nat'l Banks Ann, Rep. 93 (1965); 1965 FHLBB Ann. Rep. 74.
loo See note 99 supra.
101
 Interviews with agency representatives in Boston, Mass., Jan. 1967.
102
 Senate Hearings 125. But cf. id. at 112. The act may also lead to increased
agency action in a beneficial way. Some people have criticized the dual system of state
and federally chartered institutions as leading to a "competition in laxity" between
state and federal agencies to keep institutions within their jurisdiction. Fox, supra note
78, at 122. Since the act gives the federal agencies almost the same powers with regard
to state and federal institutions, transfers of jurisdiction by the institution will be less
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As a result of these developments, the supervisors and examiners of
four different agencies'° 3
 in approximately a dozen different regions'D4 will
be able to informally set and enforce their own standards of prudent opera-
tion. Since what is prudent, i.e., not unsafe or unsound, is essentially a ques-
tion of degree, 115
 permitting so many individuals to informally make and
enforce their own determinations of degree minimizes the role of agency
heads in determining policy and maximizes the potential for arbitrary action,
nonuniform application of standards, and undue interference with manage-
ment decision making.'"
A clear definition of standards by the agency heads would obviate these
dangers.'" By defining standards, the agency heads could circumscribe their
subordinates' action and assure themselves of their proper role in setting
policy.'" By publishing these definitions, the agency heads would lend
consistency to the administrative process and leave themselves open to con-
structive criticism and review by other professionals, the industry as a
whole, and the other branches of government. 109
 Such criticism can be an
effective safeguard against the potential dangers of the supervisory process. 11°
useful, and, therefore, federal agencies will have less need to lower standards in order
to keep financial institutions within their sphere.
105 The FHLBB and the FSLIC use the same regional officials. Interview with the
FHLBB and FSLIC representative in Boston, Mass., Jan. 1967. See FISA § IO2(a) (m) (1),
SO Stat. 1044, 12 U.S.C.A. 1730(m)(1) (Supp. 1966).
104
 The Comptroller of the Currency has fourteen supervisory districts. The FDIC
and the Board of Governors each have twelve. Welman, Jr., Allocation of Supervisory
Responsibility Today, in Bank Supervision 1I, 19-20 (Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis pub. 1963). The FHLBB and the FSLIC have eleven. See Senate Hearings 75,
105
 Questions of degree are apparent in the following categories of unsafe or un-
sound practices listed by the FHLBB:
1. Solicitation of capital on the basis of dividend rates in excess of the
[institution's] . . . ability to pay except by resorting to high-risk loans ... .
2. [O]verconcentration of loans to speculative builders . . . and lack of any
systematic collection program.
3. [L]ax control of expenses; careless physical control of the assets; [and]
excessive advertising or other costs beyond the ability of the [institution] . .
to absorb the expenses . . . .
112 Cong. Rec. 25416 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966) (FHLBB memorandum on unsafe or
unsound practices).
100
 See H.R. Rep. No. 447, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; H.R. Rep. No. 2492, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; H.R. Rep. No, 2083, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
1°7
 See Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies—The Need for Better
Definition of Standards (1962) (especially 19-26).
108 Id. at 24.
109 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 4.14 (Supp. 1965). Criticism would also be help-
ful in that it would Lessen the tendency of agency heads to uphold the supervisory
branch as a matter of course.
110
 Ibid. FISA contains a built-in opportunity for professional criticism. Before
instituting proceedings against state institutions, the federal agency • must give to the
appropriate state authority notice containing the grounds for the proposed action and
setting a reasonable time limit for correction by that authority. S. Rep. No. 1482, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966). Only if the state authority does not secure satisfactory correc-
tions within that time limit can the federal agency proceed. Management, however, can-
not raise the failure to observe these requirements in attacking any notice or order.
FISA §§ 102(a)(o), 202(m), 80 Stat. 1045, 1052, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1730(o), 1818(m)
(Supp. 1966).
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An agency can define standards formally by rule-making (i.e., by issuing
rules and regulations) and by adjudication (i.e., by rendering reasoned deci-
sions after adversary hearings). However, both the agencies and the industry
have indicated that rule-making is undesirable. 111 Rules are often drawn to
meet the problems presented by a small portion of the industry. Such rules are
usually phrased in sufficient detail and with sufficient strictness to protect the
public from the mistakes of the least sophisticated management within the
entire industry. Thus, they tend to be overly restrictive in that capable
management must also adhere to the rule drawn for the minority. In addition,
detailed rules for every aspect of an institution's operations would severely
limit management flexibility. On the other hand, adhering to specific rules
does not safeguard management from supervisory criticism, because the super-
visory authorities in a given situation may determine that the conduct vio-
lates the general proscription against unsafe or unsound practices.
Inasmuch as the first alternative is unsatisfactory, the necessary defini-
tion of standards could be supplied through adjudication. By focusing on an
individual case, the agency can consider the many fact variables that are
relevant to determining whether a practice is unsatisfactory. It might be
argued that because so much depends on fact variables, no case will be
precedent for any other. However, fact patterns in such a large industry
should recur often enough to provide a basis for precedent which will cir-
cumscribe both agency and management conduct. 112 It might also be argued
that adjudication requires considerable expenditures of time and money,
but such inconveniences are outweighed by the need for definition of standards
and the fact that increased rule-making is undesirable.
Definition by adjudication involves three steps: (1) the holding of hear-
ings; (2) the publishing of opinions; and (3) the judicial review of these
opinions. Various problems arise at each level which may forestall adjudica-
tion. As to the holding of hearings, if the regional supervisor convinces the
agency to issue temporary orders, management will be forced to comply
before it can contest the order at a hearing. The act allows the affected party
to seek a stay of temporary orders in the district courts. 113 Ruling upon the
application for a stay, a district court is to be "guided by the traditional
tests employed in actions for temporary or preliminary relief from administra-
tive action when the public interest is involved.'"" Professor Jaffe posits
two criteria for obtaining a stay, namely that the administrative action will
very likely be reversed on appeal, and that the private interest outweighs
111 Senate Hearings 19-20, 110-11; Heisler, Regulations Versus Administrative
Decisions, 18 Bus. Law. 240, 245 (1962).
112 See Friendly, op. cit. supra note 107, at 18.
113
 FISA §§ 101(a) (3) (B), (4)(E), 102(a) (1) (2), (g)(5), 202(c)(2), (1), 80 Stat.
1030, 1032, 1039, 1040, 1047, 1050, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(3) (E), 4(E), 1730(f)(2),
(g)(5), 1818(c)(2), (f) (Supp. 1966). A specific provision was necessary, because the
courts, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, have refused in
the absence of enabling provisions to review administrative action subject to review at
an administrative hearing. E.g., Home Loan Bank Board v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336
(9th Cir. .1952).
114 S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 110, at 11, 22.
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the possible harm to the public if the action is stayed.' 15 Whether a practice
is unsafe or unsound depends to a great extent on an expert analysis of the
facts; thus, the courts should give great weight to agency conclusions. There-
fore, the difficulties of showing a substantial likelihood of obtaining a re-
versal of a cease-and-desist order based on such practice will be almost in-
superable. However, when the issue is whether a party was personally dis-
honest, the courts need not afford the agencies great leeway, for this is
essentially an ethical judgment requiring little expertise. Therefore, the
affected party should find it easier to obtain a stay of a temporary suspension
and/or prohibition order. As to Professor Jaffe's second criterion, the courts
have been very conscious of the public interest and have frequently denied
stays of administrative action in this area even when the action involved
was an allegedly illegal seizure of an institution." The affected party should
therefore find it most difficult to prove that the balance of public and private
interests lies in its favor. Thus, management will be forced to first comply and
will, in many instances, then lose the desire to contest the order at an ad-
ministrative hearing.
The fear of harmful publicity is another major factor that may inhibit
management from resorting to administrative hearings. Public knowledge
that management has been cited for an unsafe or unsound practice or personal
dishonesty can induce "runs" on the institution and seriously damage the
business reputation of management, irrespective of the eventual determina-
tion of the controversy.117 Even though these results may not always follow
from publicity, the possibility that they will occur is sufficient to raise a sub-
stantial fear of publicity in the minds of management. FISA creates a pre-
sumption in favor of private hearings, but the agencies may hold public
hearings if they deem it necessary to protect the public interest.'" This
leeway affords the supervisory authorities the opportunity to use the threat
of a public hearing to coerce compliance with their directives.'" They are
115 See Jaffe, op. cit. supra note 96, at 689-97.
116 E.g., Greater Del. Valley Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, supra note 96,
at 374. In this case, the court refused the stay even though the complaint alleged that
there was no emergency, which was a prerequisite to summary seizure under the pre-
FISA provisions. See Jaffe, op. cit. supra note 96, at 691-92.
117 See H.R. Rep. No. 447, supra note 106, at 15; H.R. Rep. No. 2083, supra note
106, at 2, 4, 8-9. In one instance, the public began a "run" immediately upon learning that
the president of an association had been indicted for embezzlement of $250. The charge
was dismissed for lack of evidence at the very beginning of the trial. H.R. Rep. No. 447,
supra note 106, at 15.-
115 FISA §§ 101(a)(7) (A), 102(a) (j) (.1), 202(h)(1), 80 Stat. 1033, 1041, 1051,
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d) (7)(A), 1730(j) (1), 1818(h) (1) (Supp. 1966).
110 In Graber Mfg. Co. v, Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court
pointed out the coercive effect of holding public hearings before the Federal Trade
Commission:
[A] respondent may be quite reluctant to appear and defend, knowing that his
confidential records will be open to the public. Further, with this sword of
public disclosure held over the heads of alleged offenders, the Commission is
in a position to coerce the signing of consent decrees, by threatening a lengthy
and public complaint, and hearings. Thus, defending a complaint, even with a
valid defense, may be more damaging than signing a consent decree.
Id. at 1022. Given the fact that mere rumor of mismanagement can prompt a "run" on
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most likely to use the threat when an administrative hearing is most necessary,
i.e., when their directives rest on doubtful grounds. The supervisory authori-
ties can use the threat often, without worrying about the possible damage
to the institution if management accepts the risk and appears at the public
hearing to contest the order. Since management has already been forced, by
the temporary order, to comply with the directives, they will be reluctant to
take the additional risk of contesting the order at a public hearing, and thus,
they will rarely force the supervisory authorities to carry out the threat.
As noted above, the agency heads have a special interest in assuring that
the administrative process is carried to completion; by defining standards
through adjudication, they can control officials at all levels.120
 To protect this
interest, they could prohibit their subordinates from using the threat of
publicity as a club to induce compliance by issuing a regulation stating that
all hearings shall be private except in a very few, specifically enumerated
circumstances. If hearings are to be truly private, they must be held in such
a location as to avoid attracting attention. The agency heads could, therefore,
prescribe that hearings will be held in any reasonable location chosen by
the party afforded the hearing if there is a danger that the public would other-
wise be aware of the hearing. The best solution, of course, would be to amend
the act to provide that unless the affected party requests a public hearing, all
hearings shall be private, and that the affected party may, within reasonable
limits, choose the location of the hearing to prevent publicity; but such an
amendment is unlikely.
If the agencies or Congress are lax in providing management with the
necessary protection of privacy, the judiciary can supply this protection. The
Administrative Procedure Act provides for review by way of petitioning for
an injunction against final agency action for which there is no other remedy
in a court. 12 ' It is submitted that the district courts, by way of injunction, can
order that hearings be private. Appeal to the judiciary may itself involve
harmful publicity, but if in a few cases, the courts, contrary to practice in
other areas of administrative law, show a strong predilection for granting
such injunctions, the supervisory authorities may be reluctant to use the
threat of public hearings as a means of coercing compliance with directives.
The proposition that the courts can enjoin both the threat and the
holding of public hearings might be attacked on several grounds. All of
them, however, can be answered. First, the agency might argue that the
threat of public hearings is not reviewable under Greater Del. Valley Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 122 which held that the threat of seizure was
a financial institution, Fox, supra note 78, at 124, the coercive effect of threatening
public hearings is even greater in this area. Under FISA, failure to appear at a scheduled
bearing constitutes consent to the agency order. E.g., FISA § 101(a) (2) (A), 80 Stat.
1029, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1966). Such consent bars judicial
review. E.g., FISA § 101(a) (7) (B), 80 Stat. 1034, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d) (7) (B) (Supp.
1966).
12(1
 For an allegation that the FHLBB has failed to exercise such control, see H.R.
Rep. No. 2492, supra note 106, at 3.
121
 Compare APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.C.A. § 704 (special pamphlet 1966), with APA
§ I0(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 703 (special pamphlet 1966).
122
 262 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1 958).
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not reviewable under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 123
That doctrine, however, has no application to the threat of public hearings.
In the case of seizure, an administrative hearing is provided to review the
action, whereas under FISA, a hearing is not provided to review the de-
cision to hold public hearings.
Second, the agency might argue that the decision to hold a public
hearing is procedural and not final agency action, and, therefore, not subject
to review until an order is entered after hearing. 124 Quite obviously, if the
hearings are public, reversal of the eventual decision on this ground would
provide small consolation; the damage would have already been done. 125
In other areas of administrative law, the courts have been willing to enter-
tain suits seeking to enjoin publicity at the hearing level, albeit infrequently
granting relief.' 20 It is, therefore, likely that the decision to hold a public
hearing, even if it is procedural, will be considered final agency action subject
to review by way of injunction.
Third, FISA precludes review of agency action except as otherwise
provided in the act.'" The act provides only for a stay of temporary orders' 28
and a review of permanent orders rendered after hearing. 1 Y 9 Thus, the agency
might argue that since review by way of injunction of decisions related to the
conduct of hearings is not provided for, FISA precludes review by way of
injunction of the decision to hold a public hearing, and, therefore, that
the APA provision allowing review by petition for an injunction is inap-
plicable."° However, the reasonable construction of the preclusion provision
is that it forbids review only of the merits of the complaint, except by way
of appeal from orders issued after hearing or by way of application for a
stay if a temporary order is issued."' Under such a construction, since the
decision to hold a public or a private hearing depends on considerations
independent from the merits of the underlying controversy, the preclusion sec-
tion should not be applicable.
Finally, the agency might argue that the decision to hold a public
hearing is committed by law to its discretion, and, therefore, that APA's
provisions for review are not applicable.132 FISA provides that "hearings
123 Id. at 374.
124 See APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.CA. § 704 (special pamphlet 1966).
125 Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 303 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir, 1962), held
than an order which carried with it no penalty, fine, or sanction was not reviewable.
Since public hearings can cause great damage, that case is distinguishable.
126 Sec, e.g., Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56
(1939); Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But see SEC v. Harrison,
80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948).
127 FISA §§ 101(a)(8), 102(a)(k)(2), 202(i), 80 Stat. 1034, 1041, 1051, 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1464(d)(8), 1730(k)(2), 1818(i) (Supp. 1966).
123 FISA §§ 101(a)(3)(B), (4)(E), 102(a)(f)(2), (g)(5), 202(c)(2), (f), 80 Stat.
1030, 1032, 1039, 1040, 1047, 1050, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d) (3) (B), (4)(E), 1730(0(2),
(g)(5), 1818(c)(2), (f) (Supp. 1966).
129 EISA §§ 101(a) (7)(B), 102(a)(j)(2), 202(h) (2), 80 Stat. 1034, 1041, 1051, 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(7)(B), 1730(j)(2), 1818(h) (2) (Supp. 1966).
130 APA § 10(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(1) (special pamphlet 1966).
131 Cf. Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1966).
132 APA § 10(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (2) (special pamphlet 1966).
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shall be private, unless the [agency] . . . , in its discretion, after fully con-
sidering the views of the party afforded the hearing, determines that a public
hearing is necessary to protect the public interest.'"" However, the issue
of whether agency action is committed by law to its discretion does not depend
on whether the statute contains such words as "in its discretion." 134 Rather
it depends on the presence of standards by which a court can judge agency
action and on the importance of the interests affected. 135 The agencies are
required to weigh the private and public interests in deciding whether to hold
public hearings. To strike a balance, the agencies must assign varying im-
portance to different factors. By requiring such weighing, the act implicitly
recognizes that standards do exist to govern the decision, or that standards
can and should be formulated. Also, by creating a presumption in favor of
private hearings, the act departs from the usual preference for public hear-
ings, and thus recognizes that important private interests and, indirectly,
public interests are involved in the decision. It would, therefore, seem that
the decision to hold a public hearing is not "committed" by law to agency
discretion.
Although, as submitted, the district courts have jurisdiction to enjoin
public hearings, whether they will frequently grant relief is another question.
In one respect, the public interest favors a public hearing, inasmuch as dis-
closure may provide a basis for suits against management for misconduct.
On the other hand, public hearings may aggravate the institution's financial
condition and may thus adversely affect the interests of borrowers, depositors,
and stockholders. Moreover, if a public hearing is ordered, the affected party
may be inhibited from contesting the order at the hearing, and, thus, the
needed definition of standards will be forestalled. Finally, depriving the
agencies of the weapon of publicity would not render them less able to ful-
fill their function, since the formal sanctions should be adequate to meet
nearly all supervisory problems. Courts should accord great weight to the
presumption for private hearings in assessing abuse of discretion.
Even if management is afforded the protection of private hearings, how-
ever, it may still be reticent to resort to adjudication, out of fear that it will
be deprived of the privacy afforded at the hearings when adjudication reaches
the second step—the publication of opinions. The Freedom of Information
Act requires administrative agencies to make all opinions available to the
public.'" By specific exemption, the agencies need not make available any
material related to examination, operation, or condition reports on financial
instittitions."T This material, however, provides the facts upon which opin-
ions will be based, and thus, if the opinions are to have any value as prece-
dent, such material must be included. Yet publication in the ordinary manner
FISA §§ 101.(a)(7)(A), 102(a)(j)(1), 202(h)(1), 80 Stat. 1033, 1041, 1051,
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(d)(7)(A), 1730(j)(1), 1818(h) (1) (Supp. 1966).
184 Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715 (2d
Cir. 1966).
135 Id. at 718; Cappadora v. Celebrezze, supra note 131, at 6.
130
 APA § 3(b), as amended, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1002(b) (Supp.
1966) (effective date July 5, 1967).
137
 APA § 3(e)(8), added by 80 Stat. 251 (1966), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1002(e)(8) (Supp.
1966).
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involves the same drawbacks as holding public hearings. The Freedom of
Information Act goes on to present a solution by providing that "to the extent
required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an
agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes
an opinion ...."' 38 The deletion of identifying details is not unfeasible, since
cases could be indexed by number with names and locations stated by letters,
and harmful publicity would be minimized. Thus, the question is whether it
will be a "clearly unwarranted invasion of . . . privacy" for the agencies in-
volved to publish any opinions without first deleting identifying details.
It seems that, on a policy basis, publication with identifying details
should be held to be an invasion of privacy. By providing a specific exemption
for material related to examination reports, the act recognizes the importance
of privacy in this area. Moreover, one of the purposes of the act is to compel
the agencies to inform interested groups of the standards by which the action
of those subject to agency control will be judged.'" Since the deletion of
identifying details will encourage management to resort to their administra-
tive remedies and, thereby, assist the definition of standards, it would further
the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act to permit and, indeed, com-
pel the agencies here involved to delete identifying details.
The third step in adjudicatory definition—judicial review of opinions
rendered after hearing—should not play as significant a role in defining
standards. Since it is impracticable for the courts to provide the same pro-
visions for secrecy as the agencies, the party afforded the hearing would be
unlikely to appeal administrative orders except where those orders so effect
its vital interests as to outweigh detrimental publicity. 140 Within this limited
area, the effectiveness of the judiciary in controlling agency action will de-
pend on its approach to reviewing (1) findings of fact, and (2) the applica-
tion of such standards as "unsafe or unsound" and "personal dishonesty"
to established facts.
FISA provides that circuit courts are to review findings of fact according
to the substantial-evidence test."' This test has frequently been defined as
the equivalent of the directed-verdict test in jury trials. 142 Professor Davis
has noted, however, that the thoroughness of review within this test varies
considerably. 143 An insufficient number of cases have arisen in the area here
138 APA § 3(b), as amended, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), 5, U.S.C.A. § 1002(b) (Supp.
1966).
121)
 No .	 . opinion . . . may be relied upon, used or cited as precedent by an
agency against any private party unless it has been indexed and either made available
or published as provided by this subsection or unless that private party shall have
actual and timely notice of the terms thereof." Ibid.
140 It is probable that the first time FISA is applied, an appeal will he taken
challenging its constitutionality. It seems, however, that attacks based on constitutional
grounds will be rejected on the basis of Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), and
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
141 Compare FISA §§ 101(a) (7)(B), 102(a)(j)(2), 202(h) (2), 80 Stat. 1034, 1041,
1051, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 14G4(d)(7)(B), 1730(j)(2), 1818(h)(2) (Supp. 1966), with APA
§ 10(e), 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(E) (special pamphlet 1966).
142 4 Davis, Administrative Law § 29.02 (1958).
143 Id. § 29.11.
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involved upon which to base any judgment of how rigorously the courts will
scrutinize findings of fact.' 44
The approach to review of the application of law by the agency will
also vary. Professor Davis lists several elements which influence a reviewing
court, the primary one being the comparative qualification of the court and
the agency to make the determination. 145
 Accordingly, the court may consider
the question of application to be one of fact, or uphold the judgment where
there is a rational basis to support it, or it may view the question as one of
law and freely substitute its judgment for that of the agency.'" On the
other hand, Professor Jaffe states that the proper approach is to treat the
question as one of law and, where special knowledge is relevant, the court
should evaluate the weight of the agency's expertise. 147 The determination
of whether a practice is unsafe or unsound will involve knowledge of prac-
tices in the industry generally and their probable results—questions peculiarly
within the competence of the agencies. The reviewing court is, therefore, un-
likely to substitute its judgment. One court which adopted the Jaffe test stated
that administrative judgment is entitled to great weight on the issue whether
established conduct is unsafe or unsound. 148
 Consequently, the affected party
will find it difficult to overturn an administrative order based on such conduct.
In dealing with whether conduct involves personal dishonesty, however,
agency expertise would seem to be irrelevant. The "integrity demanded by
a position of public trust"149
 is an ethical judgment which a court is as
competent to determine as an administrative agency."° It is, therefore, sub-
mitted that whether conduct involves personal dishonesty is a question of law
as to which the courts may freely substitute their judgment for that of the
agency. This approach is particularly beneficial; since the issuance of sus-
pension, removal, and prohibition orders, for which personal dishonesty is
a prerequisite, vitally affects the interests of management, they are more
likely to appeal such orders. Thus, judicial review could be an effective check
against the misuse of the suspension, removal, and prohibition sanctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The underlying principle of FISA is that federal agencies should be able
to set and enforce standards for the prudent operation of financial insitutions
without having either to depend on the vagaries of state authority or to
resort to a war of nerves with management. By being given readily available
sanctions adopted to recurring supervisory problems, the agencies will be
able to achieve the maximum in preventive supervision. In one regard, how-
ever, the sanctions may prove deficient; Congress may find it necessary to
amend the act to provide that suspension, removal, and prohibition orders
may be issued against grossly incompetent management.
144
 Cf. Beacon Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 162 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis.
1958) (reviewing facts under the weight-of-the-evidence test).
145
 4 Davis, op. cit. supra note 142, § 30.14.
146
 Ibid.
147 Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 576-85 (1965).
145
 Beacon Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, supra note 144, at 355.
149 112 Cong. Rec. 19370 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1966) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
155
 See 4 Davis, op. cit. supra note 142, § 30.14.
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Finally, although the act promotes strong agencies, it does not contain
adequate safeguards against misuse of power, because management is not
guaranteed the full privacy necessary to encourage it to resort to adjudication.
It is up to the agencies to provide the necessary privacy by enacting proper
procedures for implementing the act, and thus strictly circumscribe agency
action that would use the threat of publicity as a means of coercing consent.
JOSEPH M. KORFF
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